Recently security has became one of the major concern in Information System (IS) development. Different security modeling language or security extension is used to model security features of IS. Mal Activity Diagram (MAD) is used at the design stage to represent security aspect. But it cannot model all the security risk management concepts. Without full coverage of concepts, it is not possible to model an IS efficiently and correctly. In this paper, first we propose a meta model for MAD which will help developers or other stakeholders to understand and use MAD correctly. Then we propose syntactic and semantic extensions of MAD to model all the risk management concepts. We have used this meta model and extension in a case study. This study shows that the meta model and extensions help us to correctly identify and model different security components of the system.
INTRODUCTION
Risk management discusses about the process of understanding and responding to factors that may lead to a failure in the confidentiality, integrity or availability of an information system. The main goal of information security is to support the mission of the organization. In actual fact all organizations are exposed to uncertainties, some of which impact the organization in a very negative manner. The need of these organisations is to focus on their most important information assets when making decisions about protecting them to achieve optimal return on security investments (ROSI) [5] . However adopting security controls to protect information assets without proper assessment of risks will either overprotect the assets, making security a hindrance to business operations, or under protect and expose the business-critical asset to threat. Implementation of security risk management solution is costly therefore due to high costs of technological security solutions and limited number of resources, the organizations need assurance that they adopt only solutions that will provide significant Return on Investment (ROI).
There are several security risk management methods [1] , [2] and frameworks [6] , [7] which can be used to investigate, analyze and risk treatment for security risk management. In this work we focus on Mal-activity diagrams [15] (MAD) to define security risk management. MAD is proposed as an extension of UML activity diagrams [14] . It helps developers to elicit the security features, attack method and their countermeasures of an IS. This allows the inclusion of hostile activities together with legitimate activities in business process models. It captures the dynamic behaviour of both the legitimate and illegitimate actors. MAD was applied for different scenarios [15] ; however they still lack structured meta-model and application guidelines. In this paper we develop a meta-model for Mal-activity diagrams and illustrate how they can be used to elicit secure assets, security risks and security requirements.
Different studies (e.g., [4] [16] ) have showed that security analysis and secure engineering practices could significantly reduce vulnerabilities if they are applied at the requirements engineering and design stages. Thus, this work is motivated to help requirement engineers and developers to understand how they can consider and model security risks at requirement engineering and system design stage. In [3] , we have seen MAD cannot model all risk management related concepts. Thus this paper is also proposing necessary extensions to cover those concepts.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 overviews different security risk related frameworks and methods. Section 3 introduces the mal-activity diagrams. In Section 4 we illustrate how Mal-activity diagrams could be aligned to the security risk management domain [10] and also propose the extensions. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Security and Security Risk Management Approaches
In this section we will discuss few security frameworks (e.g., [6] [7] ) and security risk management methods (e.g., [1] [2]) in order to highlight the key concepts regarding security risk management for IS. For example, the SQUARE method [11] suggests a nine-step process, which elicits categories and priorities security requirements. SQUARE indentifies security requirements through negotiation with the system stakeholders and security experts.
Haley et al. [6] propose a framework to define security requirements in order to fulfil the security goals. This activity is based on three major phases: definition, context, and satisfaction. The main focus of the framework is to determine security requirements in a structured way. Lee et al. [7] offer a framework based on requirements domain model (RDM), which defines a hierarchical representation of ontological concepts derived from DITSCAP (Department of Defence Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process). This framework explains relationships between security requirements and risk components. It identifies the risk components and maps them to a domain specific taxonomy (e.g., threats, assets, vulnerabilities, countermeasures).
CORAS [2] is a security risk modelling method to analyse security threats and risk scenarios. This approach focuses on security critical systems, and, mainly, targets the information technology security. It uses a customised graphical language to communicate and document security risks and also provides a detailed guidance. CORAS involves different users, system owners, and security experts.
The Tropos Goal-Risk (GR) model [1] is built on the core concept of risk and is open to any risk domain such as financial or project management and not limited to IS security. The main objective of this framework is to assess risks of uncertain events over organisation strategies and to evaluate the treatment effectiveness. Its key considerations are trust (dependency) relations among different actors. The GR model supports risk modelling based on likelihood and failure severity.
A domain model for IS security risk management (ISSRM) [10] (described in Section 2.2) is influenced by and derived from different security related standards and methods, such as, (i) security risk management standards; (ii) security-related standards; (iii) security risk management method; and (iv) security-oriented frameworks. We have selected the ISSRM domain model for our analysis, because:
 It has already been used to align concepts of the requirements engineering languages [8] [9];
 It defines the security risk management concepts at three different conceptual levels, which helps developers to identify specific IS security risk management concepts;
 It specifically focuses on IS development.
In Section 2.2 we will describe ISSRM domain model for some details.
The ISSRM Domain Model
The ISSRM domain model ( Fig. 1 ) supports security definition for the key IS constituents and addresses the IS security risk management process at three different conceptual levels: (i) asset-related; (ii) risk-related; and (iii) risk treatment-related.
Asset-related concepts explain what to be protected. Assets are anything that have value to the organisation, and the owner or stakeholder wants to protect. The notions that describe the asset-related concepts are business assets, IS assets and security criterion. Business assets are plans, processes, or information, which have value for the organisation. IS assets are IS components, which support business assets. Security criteria define the security needs of the business assets, typically in terms of confidentiality, availability and integrity.
Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself and its components are defined. Risk is a combination of threat with one or more vulnerabilities, which leads to a negative impact, harming one or more assets. An impact shows the negative consequence of a risk on an asset if the threat is accomplished. A vulnerability is expressed as the weakness or any flaws of the IS asset or group of IS assets. An event is composed of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. A threat is described as a potential attack, which may harm one or more assets by targeting IS assets. An attack method characterises a standard means by which a threat agent executes a threat.
Risk treatment-related concepts discuss about decisions, security requirements and controls to alleviate possible risks. A risk treatment is a decision (e.g., avoidance, reduction, retention or transfer) to handle the identified risk. A security requirement is the improvement and fine-tuning of the risk treatment decision to mitigate the risk. A control provides means to improve security by implementing the security requirement.
The ISSRM process is a model-based approach driven by risk analysis. This security requirement engineering process consists of six steps: (i) context and asset identification; (ii) determination of security objectives; (iii) risk analysis and assessment; (iv) risk treatment; (v) security requirements definition; and (vi) control selection and implementation. This process is repetitive, i.e., it should be executed until the sufficient security measures are defined. 
MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS (MAD)
Activity diagrams are part of the UML language [13] . Their major objective is to describe procedural logic, business process, and workflow. They can be used at different stages of the IS development process, including system and software requirement and design. Activity diagrams are often compared to flowcharts, although activity diagrams support the modelling of parallel behaviour.
Mal-activity diagrams [15] extend the concepts of Activity diagrams. They deal with the behavioural aspects of the security problems. Basic way to build a mal-activity diagram is to build a normal process first then add unwanted behaviour to this process. Similarly to the Misuse case [8] diagram, it also allows to add mitigations. It includes some extra concepts such as Mal-Activity, Mal-swimlane and Mal-decision which are opposites of the regular activity diagrams constructs. It also defines MitigationActivity and MitigationLink to show the mitigation process.
In the current literature on Mal activity diagrams we do not find any meta-model for MAD, thus we propose one in Figure  2 . MAD start with an InitialState (starting point) and finishes with a FinalState (end point). Next a diagram includes three kinds of activities: Activity, MalActivity and MitigationActivity. AnySwimlane holds all the constructs of the mal-activity diagrams. AnySwimlane can be a Swimlane or a Mal-swimlane. Swimlane contains SwimlaneElement, which can be an Activity, a MitigationActivity or a Decision. The Activity is the specification of a parameterised sequence of behaviour. The MitigationActivity shows the improvement of the process to avoid MalciousActivity. The Decision illustrates branching based on order of rejected or order of accepted conditions. A Mal-swimlane includes Mal-swimlaneElement, which could be a Mal-activity or Mal-decision. Mal-swimlane may also include legitimate activities beside mal-activities. Mal-activity is performed by a malicious actor to harm the normal process. Sometimes Malactivity can be done by a legitimate user when being fooled by an attacker. Mal-decision is a decision which is made having a malicious purpose. 
EXTENTION OF MAL-ACTIVITY DIAGRAM TO ISSRM
We have used the same research method described in [3] . In that paper, we have seen that MAD does not provide full coverage of ISSRM concepts (Table 5 .1 in [3] ). Here we will propose the syntactic and semantic extensions of MAD using the example but this time from availability perspective. In order to cover the remaining essential ISSRM features (concepts), we have introduced several new constructs, Availability, Security criterion, mitigation link, leads to, Negates, Harms, Constraint of security, decision to treat to cover the missing parts in ISSRM domain model.
Abstract Syntax
Here we will present an extended meta model in Fig. 3 . The improved version of meta model uses approximately the same meta model but with complete coverage of ISSRM domain model as shown in the diagram bellow.
Fig 3:
Alignment between improved Mal-Activity diagrams and ISSRM domain model
Online Marketing Server (Availability)
In this section we are going to illustrate denial-of-service attack (DoS) which negates security objective availability. DoS is a serious networking attack which has led many business organizations into great loss, it is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. Networking device (computer/server) is deactivated by flooding it with multiple spoofed requests. Our running example (Online Marketing Server) describes online marketing service (Fig. 4) where customers request new purchase on internet via business firm's website. Hacker is attempting to launch DoS attack (Fig. 6 ) to make service unavailable to the customers. This attempt directly affects one of the business assets (login- Fig. 5 ). Hacker is not directly benefited from the attack but he gets paid by other business competitors.
Fig 4: Online Marketing Service Architecture diagram
In Fig. 5 , customer initiates the online marketing process with an activity request new purchase by requesting purchase service via online marketing server, server receive request (Receive request) and check service availability (Check service availability) then processes the request and load the login page (load login page) only if the resource is available (Is service available?) unless otherwise it sends customer error message (Send error message) and process stops upon the delivery of the error message(Receive 550 Service unavailable).
Fig 5: Asset model-Online marketing server
Threat model is presented in (Fig. 6) where a hacker (Malswimlane) launched attack on online marketing server by sending excessive requests (Mal-activity Send multiple spoofed requests). As a result unprotected Online marketing server is deactivated due to its weakness(vulerability No scanning of incomming requests) and causes unavailability of a essential business asset (login).
Fig 6: Threat model-Online marketing server
However DoS attack can be avoided by considering our security model (Fig. 7) where Internet service provider/ISP (Swimlane) uses packet filtering technique (ingress filtering) which can prevent source address spoofing of Internet traffic (Mitigation activity: Filter out requests send by Network intruder). Therefore any malicious request is denied and ends the process. 
Risk related concepts:
ISSRM vulnerability is modelled by new Mal construct vulnerability, ISSRM impact also modelled by Mal-activities. Threat agent is represented by Mal-swimlane; threat agent holds Attack method (Combination of Mal-activity, Mal-decision, Mal-swimlane and Control Flow) using ISSRM relationship uses which is modelled by new mal construct uses. Impact is modelled by Mal-Activity Send multiple spoofed requests. Threat is represented by combination of constructs that compose threat agent and attack method while event is composed by threat and vulnerability. Event and Impact result into risk. Impact negates security criterion (new mal construct security criterion) through ISSRM relationship negates which is represented by new mal construct negates.
Risk treatment concepts: modelled by new mal construct uses. Impact is modelled by Mal-Activity Send multiple spoofed requests. Threat is represented by combination of constructs that compose threat agent and attack method while event is composed by threat and vulnerability. Event and Impact result into risk. Impact negates security criterion (new mal construct security criterion) through ISSRM relationship negates which is represented by new mal construct negates.
Risk treatment concepts ISSRM Security requirements are represented by Mitigation Activity which mitigates risk through ISSRM relationship mitigates which is also represented by mitigation link. Control is represented by swimlane while Risk treatment is represented by combination of constructs that represent security requirements, mitigates, decision to treat, implement and control, it treats risk through ISSRM relationship decision to treat which is represented by new construct decision to treat.
CONCLUSION
Firstly, this paper has shown how the ISSRM domain model could guide application of MAD. But like many other analysis it also has some shortcomings. This analysis has a certain level of subjectivity to interpret the language constructs regarding the ISSRM concepts. To mitigate this threat other examples could be analyzed by other people (e.g., practitioners, if they are willing to use MAD).
Secondly, in our study, we have found that currently MAD lacks a meta model and we have also seen that the exiting constructs of MAD could not model all ISSRM concepts. Thus, the contribution of this paper can be seen as, 1. It first presents a meta model from the exiting MAD literature [15] and then proposes an extended meta model to cover all the ISSRM related concepts. 2. It shows how the new constructs can be used to model security related concepts with the help of an example.
This work will help requirement engineers and developers to understand and model security requirements in more detail and efficient way.
Last but not the least, MAD is not the only language assessed for the IS security risk management. The ISSRM domain model has been used to evaluated Secure Tropos [4] , misuse cases [3] , and KAOS extensions to security [5] . We envision that after analyzing a number of security languages it will be possible to facilitate model transformation and interoperability between different security languages that are analysed using the ISSRM domain model. This would allow representing IS using different perspectives and ensuring IS sustainability through different development stages. 
